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Abstract
During last years poker has gained a lot of prestige in several countries and, beyond to be one of
the most famous card games, it represents a modern challenge for scientists belonging to different
communities, spanning from artificial intelligence to physics and from psychology to mathematics.
Unlike games like chess, the task of classifying the nature of poker (i.e., as ’skill game’ or gambling)
seems really hard and it also constitutes a current problem, whose solution has several implications.
In general, gambling offers equal winning probabilities both to rational players (i.e., those that use
a strategy) and to irrational ones (i.e., those without a strategy). Therefore, in order to uncover the
nature of poker, a viable way is comparing performances of rational versus irrational players during
a series of challenges. Recently, a work on this topic revealed that rationality is a fundamental
ingredient to succeed in poker tournaments. In this study we analyze a simple model of poker
challenges by a statistical physics approach, with the aim to uncover the nature of this game. As
main result we found that, under particular conditions, few irrational players can turn poker into
gambling. Therefore, although rationality is a key ingredient to succeed in poker, also the format
of challenges has an important role in these dynamics, as it can strongly influence the underlying
nature of the game. The importance of our results lies on related implications, as for instance in
identifying the limits poker can be considered as a ‘skill game’ and, as a consequence, which kind
of format must be chosen to devise algorithms able to face humans.
∗ marcojavarone@gmail.com
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Nowadays, social dynamics and modeling human behavior represent challenging topics for
scientists belonging to different communities, e.g., artificial intelligence, physics, mathemat-
ics and social psychology. Notably, the modern field of sociophysics [1] aims to investigate
social and economic phenomena by a strongly interdisciplinary approach, mainly based on
analytical and computational tools, coming from the framework of statistical physics [2–4].
Moreover, several social issues as opinion formation, information spreading and social be-
haviors, can be represented and studied by using agent-based models [5, 6] often combined
with the theory of networks [7–10]. In this work, we analyze poker games (hereinafter
simply poker) by the framework of statistical physics (see also [11]). Poker represents one
of the major challenges for artificial intelligence and mathematics [12–15];for instance, it is
worth to highlight that, in the recent study [12], the ‘heads up’ limit poker (later described)
has been solved from a game theory perspective. Furthermore, poker is a topic of interest
also for psychologists, economists and sociologists [16] due to its wide diffusion over several
countries. One of the most controversial aspects of poker, caused by the utilization of money,
is related to its nature, i.e., ‘skill game’ or gambling. The related answer has not yet been
solved [17], although it has a long list of implications [18, 19]. Furthermore, all efforts made
to define algorithms and strategies in the context of artificial intelligence are obviously based
on the confident belief that computing skills are relevant to succeed in poker. Therefore,
our investigations aim to shed some light on the nature of this game. In principle, there
are several variants of poker, e.g., Texas Hold’em, Omaha, Draw, etc., each having its own
rules. However, they all follow a similar logic: a number of cards is distributed among
players, who in turn decide if to play or not, evaluating the possible combinations of their
cards (called hand) with those on the table. Since players cannot see the cards of their
opponents, when they have to take an action (e.g., to bet money), poker is an imperfect
information game, unlike others like chess where all players get all the system information
simultaneously [20]. It is worth to observe that the utilization of money makes the challenge
meaningful, just because the underlying dynamics of poker are constituted by a series of
bets. Hence, without money players would have no reasons to fold their hands. In general,
there are two main formats for playing poker, i.e., tournament and ‘cash game’. The former
entails players pay an entry fee that goes into the prize pool plus a fee to play, receiving
an amount of chips. Then, top players share the prize pool. Instead, playing poker in the
‘cash game’ format entails to use real money during the challenge. Therefore, in this last
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case, players can play until they have money and, although there are no entry fees to pay,
a fraction of each pot is taxed (i.e., a small ‘rake’ is applied). In the work [22], the author
defined a model for representing poker challenges, focusing on tournaments, in order to
study the role of rationality. His main result was that the nature of poker does not depend
on its rules but on the players’s behavior, then identifying rationality as a key ingredient
to succeed. Hence, since the human behavior has such important role in poker, we perform
further investigations on this direction, but considering the ‘cash game’ format.
Let us now briefly recall the model described in [22] and summarize the main achieve-
ments. This model represents ‘heads-up’ challenges, i.e., challenges that involve two players
at a time. Players can be rational or irrational. The former move (e.g., bet and fold) by using
the Sklansky table [23] as reference, whereas the latter play randomly. It is worth to note
that, for the sake of simplicity, each round is composed of only one betting phase (instead, in
real scenarios, usually there are more phases [23]). Numerical simulations showed that, under
these conditions, rational players win a challenge against irrational players with probability
piwr ∼ 0.8. Hence, a rational player is supposed to win about three consecutive challenges
(W = 3) against an irrational one. As a consequence, since ‘heads-up’ tournaments have a
tree-like structure, the final winner is a rational player when the number of total participants
N , regardless of their behavior, is N ≤ 2W . After analyzing poker tournaments by different
conditions (e.g., also allowing rationals to change behavior), the author [22] states that the
nature of poker depends on the players’ behavior, but not on its rules.
Here, we focus our attention on the ‘cash game’ format. It is important to observe
that each ‘heads-up’ challenge can last from one to several rounds, in principle depending
on the amount of money opponents have available. Moreover, even after a single round one
player can leave the table (i.e., ending the challenge) with her/his remaining money. In order
to study this scenario, we consider a population of agents that interact by the dynamics of
the classical voter model [21]. In so doing, each agent has a state that represents its behavior
(i.e., rational or irrational) and, at each time step, two randomly chosen agents interact, i.e.,
they play a poker challenge. Notably, we map agent states as follows: σ = +1 for rational
agents and σ = −1 for irrational agents. Furthermore, we assume that a rational player wins
a full challenge against an irrational one with the probability piwr defined in [22]. Therefore,
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the stochastic process of a poker challenge, involving players x and y, is reduced to a coin
flip with winning probabilitiespi
w
x = 0.8 if (x! = y and σx = +1)
piwx = 0.5 if (x = y)
(1)
and piwy = 1− piwx . Then, according to voter model-like dynamics, after each interaction the
loser assumes the state (i.e., the behavior) of the winner. Since, as said before, a cash game
challenge can last from 1 to n rounds, we have two limit cases:
1. a) n = ∞: an interaction corresponds to a full challenge, as after an infinite number
of rounds one player prevails;
2. b) n = 1: an interaction corresponds to only one round.
In both cases, agents start a new challenge always with the same amount of money (called
‘starting stack’), regardless of their previous results. Furthermore, in the cash game format
the minimal amount of a bet (called ‘big blind’) does not change over time. In the pro-
posed model, we set the ‘starting stack’ to 10000 and a ‘big blind’ to 100 so, considering
the dynamics of case a, the ratio between these two parameters only affects the length of
challenges (see also [22]), while in the case b it has no influences. It is worth to highlight
that both a and b refer to real scenarios. In particular, the case b represents the so called
‘rush poker’, available in several online platforms. Moreover, we highlight that for the case
b Eq 1 cannot be used, since it holds only for a full challenge. Anyway, also for the case b,
it would be possible to derive the winning probabilities for rational agents by analyzing the
Sklansky table [23].
Now, we introduce a mean field approximation [25] of the proposed model considering,
in particular, the case a as the winning probability of rational agents is defined (see equa-
tion 1). Since agents can change state over time, i.e., from rational to irrational and vice
versa, the following equations describe the dynamics of the population
dρr(t)
dt
= a · ρr(t) · ρi(t)− b · ρi(t) · ρr(t)
dρi(t)
dt
= b · ρi(t) · ρr(t)− a · ρr(t) · ρi(t)
ρr(t) + ρi(t) = 1
(2)
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with ρr and ρi density of rational and irrational agents, respectively. Parameters a and b
represent the winning probabilities of each species (i.e., rational and irrational), then a = piwr
and b = 1− piwr . In so doing, we are studying the system by a compartmental approach, as
in SIS-like models adopted in computational epidemics [26]. As result we achieve a RIR
model (i.e., Rational → Irrational → Rational) whose solutions, computed by integrating
between 0 and t
N
(as we are considering an asynchronous dynamics) areρr(t) = ρr(0) · e
ρi(t)τ
N
t
ρi(t) = ρi(0) · e− ρr(t)τN t
(3)
with τ = (a − b) which justifies the minus in the exponent of the second equation in the
system 3. Panels a,b,c of figure 1 show ρr(t) and ρi(t) over time, according to Equations 3,
and the value of the system magnetization M defined as follows [24]
M =
|∑Ni=1 σi|
N
. (4)
Now, we focus our attention on the behavior of the system for t→∞: for τ > 0, we obtain
ρi → 0 and ρr = 1, whereas for τ < 0, the opposite happens, i.e., ρi → 1 and ρr = 0. In the
case τ = 0, as t→∞, the final equilibrium state corresponds to the co-existence of rational
and irrational agents, whose final values are ρr(0) and ρi(0), respectively. It is worth to note
that, this third equilibrium can be obtained also by solving the system of equations 2 by
setting dρr(t)
dt
= 0 and dρi(t)
dt
= 0 as, in doing so, we find a = b. Remarkably, the system
behavior can be described by the Curie-Weiss model [25] (hereinafter CW). Notably, the
agent population for τ = 0 behaves as a spin system at T > Tc (i.e., whose temperature is
greater than the Curie or ‘critical’ temperature), where the system equilibrium corresponds
to a disordered phase. Instead, in the cases τ > 0 and τ < 0 the population behaves as
a spin system at T < Tc, having two possible equilibria, both corresponding to an ordered
phase. Therefore, for τ equal to zero, the agent population is in a paramagnetic phase while,
for values of τ greater or lower than zero, it is in a ferromagnetic phase. A possible solution,
to analytically describe the agent population by using the CW model, can be devised by
mapping τ to an external magnetic field h. In doing so, we can study the system equilibria
by analyzing the free energy F . Notably, according to the Landau mean field theory [27],
the free energy F , as a function of the order parameter m, can be defined as
F (m) = −hm+ α(T )m2 + u
2
m4 (5)
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FIG. 1. From a to c: evolution of the system over time, according to the proposed RIR model.
The red dotted line represents the amount of irrational agents, the black dotted line represents
the amount of rational agents, and the continuous blue line indicates the system magnetization
M . a Results achieved by ρr(0) = 0.1. b Results achieved by ρr(0) = 0.5. c Results achieved by
ρr(0) = 0.9. From d to f : Free energy F as a function of the order parameter m, representing
the behavior of the agent population on varying τ (i.e., the winning probabilities of rational and
irrational agents). d Free energy, for T > Tc, related to the case τ = 0, and with ρr(0) = 0.5. e
Free energy, for T < Tc, related to the case τ < 0. f Free energy, for T < Tc, related to the case
τ > 0. The order parameter m has a domain defined in [−1,+1], thus functions representing F (m)
are indicated by continuous lines inside the domain of m, and by dotted lines outside the domain.
The dotted lines have been added in order to improve the quality of the pictorial representation of
the minima of F (m).
It is strongly important to note that, in a classical spin system, the magnetization m spans
from −1 to +1, and it is computed as follows
m =
∑N
i=1 σi
N
(6)
with N number of spins, whose value can be σ = ±1. Therefore, the definition of the
magnetization M in equation 4 (usually adopted in the context of opinion dynamics) and
that of m, defined in equation 6, coincide for less than the absolute value adopted in the
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former, i.e., M = |m|. Now, the extrema of Eq. can be found by computing solutions of
dF
dm
= 0. In particular, for h = 0, the two solutions are m = (0,±
√
−α(T )
u
). Here, α = cT−Tc
Tc
,
with c small positive constant, and u positive parameter, that we set to u = 1
2
. It is worth
to observe that α(T ) becomes zero as T → Tc, i.e., as the system temperature approaches
the ‘critical’ temperature. For the paramagnetic phase (i.e., T > Tc) we can set α =
1
2
, while
for the ferromagnetic phase we can set α = −1
2
. Then, Equation becomes
F (m) = −hm± m
2
2
+
m4
4
(7)
where the sign of the second term depends on the system temperature, i.e., positive for
T > Tc and negative for T < Tc. We recall that, in the paramagnetic phase, there is a
unique minimum of free energy for m = 0 —see panel d of figure 1. On the other hand,
in the ferromagnetic phase there are two minima of free energy, which correspond to ±1.
Remarkably, for values of h greater or lower than zero, one of the two minima becomes
an absolute minimum of free energy: for h > 0 the minimum corresponding to m = +1
becomes deeper than that corresponding to m = −1, while the opposite happens for h < 0
(i.e., F (−1) < F (+1)) —see panel e,f of figure 1. Then, we can study by an analytical
approach the outcomes of the proposed model in the case a, on varying the value of the win-
ning probability of rational agents piwr . We observe that the same approach cannot be used
to analyze the case b, of the proposed model, as the winning probabilities are not defined a
priori as for the case a. Therefore, the expected behavior of the case b is more complex, and
we hypothesize that its dynamics can show the presence of bifurcations. Notably, since the
Sklansky table [23] suggests to play usually with a small set of hands, many rounds will be
won by irrational agents due to several ‘fold’ actions performed by rational ones. As result,
it is possible that even for a high initial density of rational agents, sometimes few irrational
agents prevail then, for the same ρr(0), the final state of the population can be both +1
(rational) and −1 (irrational), i.e., a bifurcation emerges.
The proposed model is now studied by numerical simulations. In particular, we con-
sider populations of different size, from N = 100 to N = 1000 agents, and we perform for
each case 100 simulation runs. Since we aim to compare performances of rational versus irra-
tional agents, each simulation lasts until all agents converge to the same behavior (i.e., state).
As shown before for the RIR model, it is possible to analyze the evolution of the system,
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FIG. 2. Evolution of the magnetization on varying the initial density of rational agents ρr(0). a
Results achieved by implementing the case a: agents play full challenges. b Results achieved by
implementing the case b: agents play single rounds. Results have been averaged over 100 different
simulation runs.
for different initial densities of rational agents, by studying the magnetization M . We recall
that the value of M , according to Equation 4, ranges between 0 and 1 (i.e., 0 ≤ M ≤ 1).
When M ∼ 0, the system is in a disordered phase as there is the same amount of agents in
the two states, whereas as M → 1 the system reaches an ordered phase, characterized by
the presence of a prevailing state (σ = +1 or σ = −1). Figure 2 shows the magnetization
over time, achieved in the two considered cases (i.e.,a and b). Notably, both varying the
density ρr(0) and considering the two cases, the agent population always converges to the
same state, in full accordance with the analytical predictions shown in Figure 1 (for the
case a). Before to proceed with further analyses, it is worth to spend few words in order to
explain why the magnetization M in the panel a of figure 2 does not reach zero as in the
related analytical solution (see panel a of figure 1), i.e., for ρr(0) = 0.1. Notably, recalling
that values of M achieved in numerical simulations have been averaged over different runs,
at each single attempt the time step t corresponding to M = 0 may vary, as we are dealing
with a stochastic process, hence by averaging all results the average minimum value is not
zero. At this point, it is worth to investigate the final population state (Σ), in order to know
whether, after all challenges, agents play rationally (i.e., Σ = +1) or not (i.e., Σ = −1).
Thus, we analyze the amount of rational agents over time S(t), for different initial densities
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FIG. 3. Summation of states over time. a Results achieved by implementing the case a: agents
play full challenges. b. Results achieved by implementing the case b: agents play single rounds.
Results have been averaged over 100 different simulation runs.
ρr(0) —see figure 3. Remarkably, since values of S(t) are averaged over different simulation
runs, and by knowing that at each attempt the population reaches an ordered phase, we
may derive the probability Pwr that rational agents prevail on irrational ones on varying
ρr(0). Notably, these winning probabilities have been computed for different values of ρr(0)
from 0 to 1, focusing on small values close to 0 (e.g., 0.0033, 0.01, 0.05) for the case a and
on high values close to 1 (e.g., 0.97, 0.98, 0.99) for the case b. The main reason to explore
in particular low ρr(0) for the first case and high ρr(0) for the second case lies in the fact
that, observing figure 3, we found that rational agents easily prevail playing full challenges
(i.e., a) against irrational agents that, in turn, prevail many times playing single rounds
(i.e., b). We want to highlight that results shown in panel a of figure 3 are completely in
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FIG. 4. Probability that rational agents prevail (Pwr ) on varying ρr(0). In the legend, A refers to
the case a and B to the case b. The two black lines (i.e., the dotted and the continuous one) refer
to the computed fitting functions. The green continuous line separates the upper side of the plane,
i.e., the ‘skill game’ area, from the lower side, i.e., the gambling area.
accordance with the analytical solution, as simulations of case a have been always performed
with τ > 0 as piwr = 0.8 (see panelf of figure 1); moreover, as we hypothesized before, a more
complex behavior emerges in the case b. In particular, when agents play single rounds, the
value of M only increases up to 1, but considering the summation S(t), we observe that
few irrational agents can sometimes turn into irrational the whole population even for a
high initial density of rational agents. Eventually, figure 4 further highlights the detected
differences between the two considered scenarios. Notably, we computed fitness functions
for both cases, identifying a simple step function for a, and the function
Pwr (ρr(0)) = ρr(0)
3/2 (8)
for b. It is worth to recall that the function defined in equation 8 allows to fit results of
simulations (in the case b), and it has not been defined by the analytical approach. On
one hand, it is interesting to observe that in full challenges even the presence of only one
rational agent can entails the transition to an ordered ‘rational’ phase. On the other hand,
when playing single rounds, rational agents prevail with a probability greater than 50% only
if ρr(0) > 0.7 hence, in our opinion, poker in this last case can be considered as gambling.
All these results confirm that classifying the nature of poker is a tricky task, as a lot
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of conditions must be considered in real scenarios. In particular, according to the proposed
model, although in tournaments it seems rationality be a key ingredient to succeed [28],
in the cash game format it may be sometimes appropriate to associate poker to gambling.
Moreover, considering all risks of poker in the cash game format (see [28]), we think both
players and scientists working on poker be aware of our results. A further important point to
discuss, before to conclude, is related to the validity of out model in real scenarios. Notably,
although it would be extremely interesting to compare outcomes of the proposed model with
real data, this is not possible as no similar datasets exist. Anyway it may be possible to
evaluate if a player is adopting mainly a random strategy or a rational one as, according
to the rules [23], often players have to show their hands after the round to discover who
is the winner. Finally, we deem the importance of our results lies on related implications.
Notably, we found that not only the player’s behavior but also the format of poker must
be considered when classifying the nature of this game, showing that there are well defined
limits poker can be considered as a ‘skill game’.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
MAJ is extremely grateful to Adriano Barra for all priceless suggestions. Furthermore,
the author would like to thank Fondazione Banco di Sardegna for supporting his work.
[1] Galam, S.Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 336 1-2 49–55 (2004)
[2] Castellano, C. and Fortunato, S. and Loreto, V.Rev. Mod. Phys. 81-2 591–646 (2009)
[3] Barra, A., Contucci, P., Sandell, R., Vernia, C.Scientific Reports 4 4174 (2014)
[4] Agliari, E., Barra, A., Galluzzi, A., Javarone, M.A., Pizzoferrato, A., Tantari,
D.arXiv:1503.00659 (2015)
[5] Biondo, A.E., Pluchino, A., Rapisarda, A.Physical Review E 88-6 (2013)
[6] Biondo, A.E., Pluchino, A., Rapisarda, A.Journal of Statistical Physics 88-6 (2013)
[7] Javarone, M.A.Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 414 19–30 (2014)
[8] Tomassini, M., Pestelacci, E., Luthi, L.International Journal of Modern Physics C 18-7 (2007)
[9] Javarone, M.A., and Armano, G.J. Phys. A: Math. Theor. 46 455102 (2013)
11
[10] Nyczka, P., Sznajd-Weron, K.Journal of Statistical Physics 151 174–202 (2013)
[11] Sire, C.Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment P08013 (2007)
[12] Bowling, M., Burch, N., Johanson, M., Tammelin, O.Science 347-6218 145–149 (2015)
[13] Dahl, F.A.Machine Learning: ECML 2001 - LNCS 2167 85–96 (2001)
[14] Teofilo, L.F., Reis, L.P., Lopes Cardoso, H.Information Systems and Technologies (CISTI),
2013 8th Iberian Conference on 1–6 (2013)
[15] Seale, D.A., Phelan, S.E.Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 23-4 335–352 (2010)
[16] Poker: A big deal. Economist (22 December 2007), p. 31.
[17] Hannum, R.C., Cabot, A.N.UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal 1-13 (2009)
[18] Kelly, J.M., Dhar, Z., Verbiest, T.Gaming Law Review 3-11 (2007)
[19] Cabot, A., Hannum, R.TM Cooley L. Rev. 22-443 (2005)
[20] Colman, A.M.: Game Theory and Its Applications Digital Printing, 2008.
[21] Liggett T.M.: Interacting Particle Systems. Springer-Verlag, New York (1985).
[22] Javarone, M.A.Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment P03018 (2015)
[23] Sklansky, D., and Malmuth, M.: Hold ’em Poker for Advanced Players. Two Plus Two Publi-
cations (1999)
[24] Mobilia, M. and Redner, S.Phys. Rev. E 68-4 046106 (2003)
[25] Barra, A.Journal of Statistical Physics 132-5 787–809 (2008)
[26] May, R.M., Anderson, R.M.: Infectious diseases of humans: dynamics and control. Oxford
University Press (1991)
[27] Huang, K.: Statistical Mechanics. Wiley 2nd Ed. (1987)
[28] Javarone, M.A.Theory and Applications in Mathematical Physics World Scientific (2015)
12
